

1962

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

HOUSE

18321 FOIA b6

pass this legislation, I think, without question, the United Nations would have to abandon operations both in the Near East and the Congo. I believe this would be disastrous to our foreign policy by jeopardizing peace in both these areas. It would make the United Nations a mere debating society and just what the Communists desire—an ineffective organization which at the same time would be a sounding board for their propaganda.

The effectiveness of the United Nations in carrying out its peacemaking functions is demonstrated by the intensity of the Soviet bloc's opposition to it. The former Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Lodge, testified that over 200 Communist agents were ready to go into the Congo when the first crisis appeared there and were only prevented from doing so by the action taken by the United Nations.

However, I feel that the role of the United Nations in the Congo should be limited to its proper function—namely, attempting to keep the peace and to prevent international threats to such a peace. It should confine its efforts so that they will be in compliance with chapter 1, article 2, paragraph 7, which provides that the United Nations shall not intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.

There has also been alarm expressed that with the admission to the United Nations of new and inexperienced nations from the Afro-Asian bloc there is the danger that the United Nations will embark upon a course of action of which we do not approve and yet would be committed to support. While theoretically this might happen, from a practical standpoint, I do not feel it is a valid objection because we always have the power of veto in the Security Council and in any matter of importance the General Assembly would have to adopt a policy by a two-thirds vote. Certainly with the leadership of the United States and our allies among the major powers, we should be able to control one-third plus one of the voting strength of the United Nations.

For us to withdraw from the heart of Africa and allow the Communists to take over; for us to withdraw from the Near East and allow the Israel-Arab situation to get out of hand; and for us to take away the peacekeeping functions of the United Nations, in my judgment, would not only imperial our foreign policy and security, but might well bring on a crisis of unknown proportions. To protect our interests in those areas it would be necessary not to spend \$100 million for a loan, but to run the risk of sending our own boys to fight in defense of those areas at a cost that would make the expenses of the loan look like a drop in the bucket.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HALL).

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I still believe in the United Nations. I recently attended the 15th World Assembly on Health as one of the congressional ad-

visers, and have written at length in the Congressional Record about some of our accomplishments therein. I think you know Mr. JUDG. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? He says his motion.

Mr. HALL. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota. I read the gentleman's report on the World Health Assembly and his participation in it, and I thought it was one of the most effective, hard-headed, realistic, and appraisals of the work of that organization of any I have seen. I compliment the gentleman on his contribution and on his useful report about the meeting.

Mr. HALL. I thank the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. Chairman, I want the United Nations to live and function according to its original mission. I do not want another League of Nations.

However, there is some real question in my mind as to how best to effect this. I am concerned by seeming paradoxes and divergence of opinion as to the minority and majority views; the colloquy we have had here on the floor today; the question of fiscal responsibility or not within the organization, its definition of "function" and "mission," the need or not for this particular legislation, its future and where it goes in view of its policies and the addition of irresponsible new or emergent nations in a quantity sufficient to outvote those of us who are founders and have proven responsibility, the divergence in the question of the legality of the law of the nations within the United Nations, and the decision of the World Court. Therefore, being concerned, I look further into the people assigned in the Foreign Service of the State Department, and I am concerned about some of them and about the recommendations being made and the recent history of U.N. actions.

I would like therefore to propose some provocative, and perhaps paradoxical questions and facts for the Record in the short time I have as the day is waning, and hope that they will be acknowledged and answered by voting time tomorrow.

Mr. Chairman, yesterday, for two reasons, others and I gladly returned earlier than planned, to the Capitol and this House, on call of the Armed Services Committee. I am privileged to serve there, and glad I returned, although both events were sickening to the point of nausea.

The first was the Joint Armed Services Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee audit of the Secretary of State, Lieutenant General Carter, acting Director of CIA, and a representative of the Department of Defense. I have never seen such lack of perception, such ineffectiveness and evasion, such dealing with our Nation's issues from a policy of fear—when we hold all the trumpets—insofar as Cuba, the Congo, Berlin, and other troubled areas are concerned. It was made abundantly clear that the representatives of, and the temper of, the people themselves—would not much longer brook delay, dishonesty, and ineptness. It made one wonder if the State Department is as strong as it presumably should be, or if the President has other

advisers? On this floor yesterday two colleagues announced legislative bills introduced amidst this faltering situation in Cuba, and our do-nothing or "no win" policy of the administration—the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces. From what I have heard on the Armed Services Committee today I admit I am frightened, but I hope not unwilling to stand and save our honor and esteem. Second, I heard the greatest exposure of apparent "conflict of interest" on national or international record. It pertained specifically to the U.N. and its Congo actions. It involved the "establishment," behind the scenes in our sovereign government and the U.N. documents, if not proves, the sale of lives for gain while maintaining power in invisible government, to say naught of our foreign aid administrator and the Secretary of the State Department.

No wonder we are bankrupt morally and financially—yet here we are today, considering ways and means of bailing out this organization of "one worldism," at our unsuspecting—and sometimes, I fear, uninterested—taxpayers' expense. As though this were not enough, I would like to give our colleagues this additional background of the U.N.-Congo affair on which to base their considered, moral, political, social, and spiritual—I hope—judgment.

U.N. CHAIRMAN

Because of its ill-fated meddling in the domestic political affairs of the Belgian Congo, the United Nations is now facing the most serious internal troubles of its 17-year existence. The best guess is that the U.N. with help from many sources—some surprising and bizarre—will survive this crisis; but its prestige will be badly injured, and its usefulness as a peacemaking body may be virtually ended.

Here, in capsule form, is the story of the political mess into which the world body has worked itself, and how it got that way:

In the summer of 1960, spurred on by the anticolonialist frenzy of the Afro-Asian bloc, the Security Council voted to send troops into the Belgian Congo to bring about the complete restoration of law and order. To me, this meant that U.N. troops were expected to put an end to the pillaging and widespread slaughter of white residents which had broken out immediately after the departure of the Belgian military forces, or a civil action.

From the beginning the work of the U.N. task force was severely handicapped because Soviet Russia was engaged in a clandestine campaign to take over the Congo, and because the U.N. representative on the ground, Mr. Dayal of India, showed an open bias in favor of the Communists. Mr. Dayal got the peace operation off to a bad start, and his successor or U.N. headman, showed no better judgment. They persisted in playing favorites and mixing in local politics. The most flagrant example was the use of military force to compel Premier Tshombe of Katanga Province to submit to the Central Government of Cyrille Adoula. This needless war was eventually called off because it aroused